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Onslaught of the Rohingya people in Myanmar constitutes the textbook example of ethnic cleansing 
in contemporary time. The Rohingya, an ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic group living in the Rakhine 
state of Myanmar, are considered among the most persecuted, vulnerable, and oppressed minorities in 
the world. They are victims of human rights violations and oppressions in various forms including, 
extrajudicial executions, forced eviction from settlements, land grabbing, bonded and forced labors and 
so on (Mohajan 2018).  Several episodes of crackdown on the Rohingya people have forced them to 
flee and take refuge in Bangladesh, the Middle East, and Southeast Asian countries, forming a 
transnational body of Rohingya communities. Scholars are divided in their opinions regarding the 
origin and historical roots of the Rohingya. Their distinctive identity claims have evolved within a 
context largely defined by Buddhist-Muslim tensions and their ethnic recognition has reached a 
premature end due to the authoritarian regimes (1962–2011) in Myanmar (formerly Burma). The 
present paper would shed light on the making of contested Rohingya identity in various political and 
cultural contexts and explore the implications of their forced migration to Bangladesh.  
The term Rohingya denotes an ethnoreligious identity of Muslims in the Rakhine State of Myanmar. 
The name came into existence in the 1950s and term became part of public discourse since then. A few 
Muslim intellectuals of the North Rakhine State of Myanmar used the term ‘Rohingya’ to refer 
themselves (Tha 1960, Chan 2005, Rozali 2006). However, the meaning of Rohingya identity today is 
rooted in the precolonial past of the Buddhist kingdom of Arakan (present day Rakhine State) and 
significantly shaped by Buddhist-Muslim tensions. This religious tensions have been intensified under 
the auspices of political and geopolitical factors. As a result, the history of the Rohingya has been 
subjected to political manipulations by the historians based on their respective sides of ethnic faultlines. 
Rohingya historians claim a native status for them based on many treatises indicating their ancestors’ 
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presence in present-day Rakhine State for over a thousand years (Bhattacharya 2012), which the 
Burmese historians find as to be ‘fictitious stories, myths and legends’ (Chan 2005). The Burmese 
identifies the Rohingyas as the direct descendants of ‘immigrants’ from the Chittagong District of 
Bangladesh (formerly East Bengal) during colonial period. Following from this line of reasoning, the 
Burmese administration do not recognize Rohingya as an ethnic category, rather they define the 
Rohingya as Bangladeshi (a nationality) and Bangali (an ethnolinguistic category), which provide the 
justification for state sponsored oppression and onslaught on the Rohingya. However, these contested 
and opposed historical explanations essentially call for a reexamination of Rohingya origin, 
ethnohistory and the earliest presence of their ancestors in Rakhine State.   
 
Historical Landscape and Shifting State Boundaries 
Ancient and Medieval History of Arakan and Chittagong 
 
Arakan is composed of a complex ethnoreligious setting and situated between Muslim Bengal and 
Buddhist Burma. Arakan is a strip of coastal plains, mangrove marshlands, and river valleys that runs 
in a north-south direction along the eastern Bay of Bengal. The history of Arakan province suggests 
that this region remained contested between the rulers of India and Burma (present-day Myanmar) (Tha 
1960).  
A part of the Muslims in Arakan state of Burma also trace their origin to the Arabian traders from 
the Middle-East who came through the Maritime Spice Routes. The Spice Routes, also known as 
Maritime Silk Roads, is the name given to the network of sea routes connecting the East to the West 
particularly, in this case, linking the Arabian Peninsula to the Far East (See Map – 01). The Maritime 
Spice Routes were, and still are, trade routes. Since our very earliest known history trade has been 
playing an important role in human life exchanging not only goods and services but also exchanging 
ideas, faith and religion among other things. A long chain of buyers and sellers were interwoven in 
relationships along the coastlines of the Maritime Routes. Besides exchanging goods, the sea ports 
along the Maritime Silk Roads (Spice Routes) acted as melting pots for cultures, ideas and information. 
Among all other forms of exchanges, the most important was the exchange of knowledge. The ships 
carried, along with valuable cargos on board, knowledge of new peoples and their religions, languages, 
expertise, artistic and scientific skills. The Arabian trade ships carried Islam along the coastlines of the 
South and Southeast Asia. Many Muslim Arabian traders had settled down in port towns of India, 
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Bangladesh, Burma and other countries during the middle ages. They developed affinal relations with 
local people in the processes of settlement.  
The Muslim settlements started along the coastline of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean started 
long before the Muslims came into power of this region which can be traced to 7th to 8th 
centuries(Pearson 2003). Many historical accounts and evidence show that the Arabs had business 
terms with Bengal that started during the Pala empire (750-1174 C.E) (Chaudhuri and Chaudhuri 1985). 
Along with the business and trading, a Muslim settlement began in the coastal areas, especially in 
Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar and adjacent areas long before official Muslim rule began in Bengal. It is also 
assumed Arab Muslims formed an independent state in the areas of Chittagong to Arakan in the tenth 
century (Pearson 2003). This empire was mentioned in ‘Radjatuya’ -the royal chronicle of Arakan 
where an account describes that the Arakan king Surtan invaded an area in 953 AD and marked it with 
‘Chettagoung’. Also suggested that the term Surtan came from ‘Sultan’ (king) and the invaded place is 
now known as Chittagong. However, it can be noted that there are significant number of Arabic and 
Persian words in the vocabulary of Cox’s bazaar dialect and the natives of this area claims their Arabic 
ancestry. A king of Gaur (North-west Bengal) sultan Jalauddin supported the Arakanese King 
Normikhla (later known as Solainman after being converted to Islam) in his fight against the Burmese 
king. Chittagong remained part of Arakan till it was conquered by the Mughals. 
The early modern Buddhist kingdom of Arakan had its own independent history centered on Mrauk 
U. King Min Saw Mon, the founder of Mrauk-U Dynasty (1430-1784) was exiles in Bengal for 
twenty-four years and received military assistance of the Sultan of Bengal to regain his kingdom 
(Subrahmanyam 1997, Van Galen 2008). He allowed many Bangali to settle down in Mrauk-U and 
built the Santikan mosque. They were some of the early Muslim settlers in Arakan. The Moghal 
historian Talish, a Moghol historian, noted that the Portuguese pirates used to sell their captives to the 
Arakanese who employed these prisoners in agriculture and other kinds of services (Talish 1907, Chan 
2005). Moreover, the Mrauk-U kings were Buddhist yet they adopted some Islamic traditions of using 
silver coins with Persian Muslim titles and occasionally used Muslim costumes in the style of the Sultan 
of Bengal (Charney 1998, Leider 1998, Van Galen 2008, d’Hubert 2014). There were some Muslim 
élites at the court of the Arakanese King who served the King perform these Islamic conventions 
(Charney 1998, Charney 1999) and transcribed the Bengali, Persian and Arabic literature. The 
linguistic traces of Arab and Persian in Arakan Muslims’ eastern Bengali dialects point to these 
multifaceted contacts. During the 15th century, the use of Muslim titles by Arakanese kings and 
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inscribed coins suggests that the Bengal sultanate had a cultural impact on the court elite of Mrauk U 
(Leider 1998). In the 15th and 16the centuries several Muslim ministers, court members and poets were 
employed in the Roshanga royal court (Alam 1999). Daulat Kazi, Alaol, Kureshi Magon are such 
famous names. Alaol, the greatest Bengali poet in the medieval period, known as was the official poet 
in the Roshanga Royal court (Alam 1999, d’Hubert 2014, d'Hubert 2018). Different sources also 
validated the presence of Muslim in early modern period including the presence of Sufi saints, respected 
as the protectors of sailors and resident communities of Muslim traders in Arakan. Again, Chittagong, 
the affluent port of Bengal ruled by Muslim lords, was conquered by the Arakanese during sixteenth 
century and Chittagong’s Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist populations significantly contributed to the 
economic prosperity of Arakan.    
Several ethnic groups with their diverse culture and language, used to live in the region. These 
inhabitants included different groups e.g. Sino-Tibetan or Tibeto Burman speakers as well as Arabs, 
Bengalis and others. The Marma and Rakhine are the Tibeto-Burman speaking groups and they were 
colloquially called the ‘Maghs’. During the medieval period, the Magh pirates in collaboration with the 
Portuguese pirates became a major threat for the coastal areas of Bengal and Arakan (Sengupta 2001). 
The popular Bangla phrase ‘Magher Mulluk’ refers to the state of anarchy and lawlessness developed 
by the Maghs. When the Mughal commander, Islam Khan Chishti, conquered Bengal in 1610, 
Chittagong remained beyond his control. Far later, Subahdar (governor) Shaista Khan conquered 
Chittagong and won over the Maghs and the Portuguese. Arakan still remained independent. The 
Mughal boundary extended upto Ramu of modern-day Cox’s Bazaar region. When Shah Suja (brother 
of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb) fled to Arakan as a result of fraternal dispute, he was cordially received 
by the Arakanese King Sudhamma (Tha 1959). However, he was killed later on in 1661. Following 
his assassination, a number of Muslim populations from all over India started to come to Arakan. In 
fact, Shah Suja’s death was followed by a total anarchy in Arakan. 
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Map – 01: Long Distance Trade Routes (Maritime and Silk) Connecting the West to the Far East. 
 
The Colonial History  
 
Although present boundaries between Chittagong District of Bangladesh and Rakhine State of 
Myanmar are clearly demarcated by international borders as separate geographic entities belonging to 
two different independent states, but this does do not go back very far in history when both these two 
places belonged to the same political unit, British India, until late 1940s. Arakan had been an 
independent kingdom until 1784, when it was conquered by the Burmese. Arakan had been an 
independent kingdom until 1784, when it was conquered by the Burmese. The Province remained 
under Burmese rule between 1784 to 1826. After that, the then Arakan Province was surrendered to 
British India as outcomes of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826) under the terms of the Treaty 
of Yandabo in 1826 (Chan 2005). The war concluded in the winning of Arakan Province as to be the 
southern extension of Chittagong District for the British Empire. The movement of people between 
Chittagong and Arakan became more intensified during this period. Sir, Arthur Phayre, the first Deputy 
Commissioner of Arakan, mentioned about the local population of Arakan as:  
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The inhabitants are, In the Plains – 1. Ro-khoing-tha (Arakanese)- 2. Ko-la (Indian) – 3. Dôm 
(Low Caste Hindu). In the Hills – 1. Khyoung-tha – 2. Kumé or Kwémwé – 3. Khyang – 4. 
Doing–nuk, Mroong, and other tribes… While the Arakanese held these possessions in 
Bengal, they appear to have sent numbers of the inhabitants into Arakan as slaves, whence 

























Map – 02: The Growth of British India and Burma during Colonial Period. 
Source: (Joppen 1907) 
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Following the invasion of the Burmese king Bhodapaya in 1784, the Arakanese fled to the bordering 
hills that was governed by the British East India Company. Since then a number of Arakanese including 
both Buddhists and Muslims started to migrate to nearby Ramu and Teknaf area which are now parts 
of Cox’s bazaar district. Around 1798-99 the British East Company appointed Captain Hiram Cox to 
rehabilitate the refugees. Each refugee family was granted 1 hectare (2.472 acre) of land and 26 maunds 
of food grains as food support for six months. The area was named after him as Cox’s Bazaar. Some 
historians argue that these migrant Arakanese Muslims were known as Roains (Rohingyas).  
Some of the Arakanese refugees formed a rebellion against the Burmese king and sought support 
from the British. The British, in return, handed over three rebel leaders to the Burmese. Later on, when 
the Arakanese rebellion began insurgency and fight against the Burmese king, the British East India 
Company supported the Burmese king. The Burmese took control of Arakan and proceeded towards 
Chittagong and Manipur claiming these areas as integral part of Burma. At one point, the Burmese 
force occupied Shahpari Island killing the employees of East India company. That was the beginning 
of Anglo-Burmese dispute that resulted in three major warfares in 1825,1852 and 1885 and the 
colonization of Burma by the British. As the British rule began, a number of fortune-seekers that 
included the Rohingyas once again moved to Arakan and other parts of Burma, while the refugees of 
Arakan were also appointed as laborers by the British to clear jungle and other construction works. 
 
Rohingya Identity: Ethnoreligious and Ethnolinguistic Faultline  
 
There are hardly any anthropological investigations carried out on Rohingya identity as a culturally 
distinctive category. There is limited access to essential information and documentation. The term 
Rohingya had been used in in the late 1950s in North Arakan to denote a religious identity for the 
region’s Muslim community, as distinct from and in opposition to its majority Buddhist population. 
This identity also refers to an ethnopolitical category particularly emerged in the context of the 
sociopolitical challenges developed after the independence of Burma in 1948 (Chan 2005). According 
to Chan, the Rohingya identity claims can be understood in a narrative context that includes the 
simultaneous rise of Rakhine Buddhist nationalism in the 1950s, and later, the political oppression and 
impoverishment that constrained the lives of both Buddhists and Muslims between 1962 and 2011 
(ibid). Similar to ethnic or social identities in other context, the Rohingya identity is an unstable signifier 
pointing to various features of organization. Moreover, the global media representations have signified 
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the Rohingyas as being stateless victims of systematic oppression, whose refugee status and 
disenfranchisement are defining elements of their public identity (ibid). 
The Rohingya are a multilayered Muslim community. According to Chan, “the Muslims in the 
Arakan State can be divided into four different groups, namely the Chittagonian Bengalis in the Mayu 
Frontier; the descendants of the Muslim Community of Arakan in the Mrauk-U period (1430-1784), 
presently living in the Mrauk-U and Kyauktaw townships; the descendants of Muslim mercenaries in 
Ramree Island known to the Arakanese as Kaman; and the Muslims from the Myedu area of Central 
Burma, left behind by the Burmese invaders in Sandoway District after the conquest of Arakan in 1784 
(Chan 2005). The Rohingya identity formation is an ongoing process and differently being represented 
in international media as stateless and as a state-oppressed Muslim minority after riots in Rakhine State 
in the 1990s and onward. It is, however, an ethnic category that includes Muslim communities in the 
North Arakan region having similar cultural features but with a diverse historical background.  
The Myanmar government officially rejects Rohingya as an ethnic denomination and consider them 
as a threat for developing political movements  aiming at the creation of an autonomous Muslim area 
in North Arakan (Chan 2005). The Myanmar’s military and authoritarian state governments have 
described Rohingyas as a political and demographic threat since 1980s. The ethnic tensions between 
the Arakanese and the Rohingya have aggravated by the discriminatory state policies of exclusion and 
deprivation of rights, and gradually led to the lasting and violent conflicts in Arakan Shate.  
The ethnoreligious hostility between the Muslim Rohingya and Buddhist Arakanese, the 
demographic majority of the Rakhine State, has also been accelerated by the radical Buddhist 
nationalism of ma bat tha movement also known as 969 movement. This is a nationalist movement 
opposed to what they see as Islam’s expansion in predominantly-Buddhist Burma and spreads 
islamophobia by communicating apprehensions about Islam’s expansion in the Buddhist Burma. This 
anti-Muslim movement was launched and led by Ashin Wirathu, a Burmese Buddhist monk and 
communal leader, in 2001. The Movement continued in the Mandalay riots of 2013. Wirathu had deep 
hatred against the Muslims refused to call the Ronhingya community by the name, and instead claims 
they are from Bangladesh and prefers to call them Bangladeshi. Although there are about 5% Muslims 
in Myanmar which has a population of 5.4 million, according to 2014 Census, yet Wirathu pushes the 
idea that Islam and the Muslims tends to put Buddhism and essence of Myanmar in threat. On 20 June 
2013, the cover story of Time magazine mentioned Wirathu as "The Face of Buddhist Terror". 
Referring to Muslims, Wirathu says, “you can be full of kindness and love, but you cannot sleep next 
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to a mad dog…. If we are weak, our land will become Muslim.” In similar instance, he says, ““I am 
defending my loved one like you would defend your loved one. I am only warning people about 
Muslims. Consider it like if you had a dog, that would bark at strangers coming to your house – it is to 





















The Rohingyas have always been subject to oppressions in the independent Burma. General Ne 
Win’s Dragon Operation to suppress ethnic uprising resulted in the mass exodus of the Rohingyas to 
Bangladesh began in 1978. After an agreement between two countries, most of the Rohingyas 
repatriated although many of them were left behind. In the General Election of 1991, opposition leader 
Aung San Suu Kyi ‘s party won all the seats in Arakan. As the government did not hand over the power 
to Suu kyi’s party, they again began a repressive move which resulted in mass exodus of 250,000 
Rohingyas to Bangladesh. Following a series of bilateral negotiation, only 7000 Rohingyas were 
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repatriated and many thousands refused to go back apprehending the repression and eviction. Since 
then flow of the Rohingya Muslims became common, which became intense in 2011 and 2014 
following the inter-ethnic riots and attack on the Rohingyas in Myanmar. 
The above accounts depict two major lines of history. The Muslims of Burma has diverse ancestral 
connection, Bengali connection is one of them but not the only one. In fact, like the Bengalis, they also 
claim Arab ancestry, and in many cases, Magh, Dutch and Portuguese ancestries are also found. Second, 
Arakan has been a region that was subject to repressions of both sides-on the one side, there were the 
Burmese who treated Arakan as their remote unreachable outpost but always eager to occupy it; and 
on the other, there were the Bengal – whose boundaries with Arakan often propagated. Although the 
local dialect of Chittagong sounds pretty similar with the Rohingya (roains) language, as it is with the 
Chakma dialect, the languages are not same. The Rohingya language can be easily identified as distinct 
by the people who are familiar with different dialects of Chittagong region. 
 
Profiling Bangladesh: Challenges and Concerns  
Historical and Politico-economic Settings  
 
Bangladesh is a fairly recent Muslim nation that came into existence in 1971. Following from the 
about two hundred years of British colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent, Bangladesh appeared as 
East Pakistan as India partitioned in 1947, and of late, achieved independence from Pakistan (erstwhile 
West Pakistan) after a nine-month long war of liberation in 1971. During the partition, from the political 
point of view, emphasis on religious affiliation (Hinduism or Islam), and the Hindu- Muslim difference 
ultimately led to the creation of two independent states in 1947: Hindu concentrated India the Islamic 
state of Pakistan. Although religious identities influenced the post-colonial independence, but language 
difference (Urdu and Bangla) justified the second struggle for independence and the emphasis on a 
common Bangali identity led to the liberation war and finally to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. 
Today, almost 90% of Bangladesh’s population adheres to the religion of Islam making the Muslims 
as the overwhelming majority followed by almost 8% Hindu population and the remaining 2% 
constituting the Christians, Buddhists and indigenous people. The political instability of Bangladesh, 
along with its ravaging poverty, famine, natural disasters and over population stigmatized the country 
with a hopeless image, particularly expressed in the words of Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary 
of State, as the ‘bottom less basket’ case during early seventies. Renowned Noble Laureate Amartya 
State Onslaught and Ethnic Faultlines 
47 
 
Sen analyzed the situation of Bangladesh as a land not only whose ‘granary is full of rice’ and ‘ponds 
are full of fish’, but also a land that experiences famine and poverty (Sen 1981). However, the 
remarkable achievements of Bangladesh in the economic sphere, of recent times, along with its 
resilience against recurrent natural disasters and 2008 global economic crisis, suggest that Bangladesh’s 
economic growth can outpace its population growth. Bangladesh’s economy recently proved to have 
bypassed the global financial crisis of 2008 and the country has proven ability to withstand disasters 
brought about by recurrent floods and cyclones as well as the microfinance movement have been 
widely acclaimed globally as role model for poverty alleviation.  
Extreme climatic events and recurrent disasters have swept the development achievements of 
Bangladesh from time to time over the centuries and imposed much havoc on the well-being and socio-
economic situation of the people. Impacts and shocks caused by natural disasters have contributed 
significantly to the pauperization processes in Bangladesh. Researchers often argue that, frequent 
devastation by natural disasters have been one of the major causes for the country being so poverty 
stricken (Mirza 2003). It is believed that managing disasters is a vital prerequisite for the country’s step 
towards any long–term development goals. The Government of Bangladesh has attached high 
importance to disaster management in pursuit to achieve and sustain its development efforts (Mirza, et 
al. 2003). It is evident that vulnerability of the country to climate change is the result of a complex 
interrelationship among biophysical, social, economic and technological factors of the country. Many 
anticipated adverse impacts of climate change would in fact aggravate many of the existing stresses that 
already pose a serious impediment to economic development of Bangladesh (Ali 1999). 
 
Socioecological and Environmental Settings  
 
Bangladesh is a disaster-prone country. Both in Copenhagen and in Cancun, the world community 
unanimously agreed that Bangladesh is the country most vulnerable to climate change impacts. Due to 
climate change, hydro-meteorological disasters (cyclone, flood, drought, etc.) will be more frequent 
with increased magnitude. Almost every year, the country experiences disasters causing heavy loss of 
life and property and jeopardizing the development activities. The country is already beset with many 
problems like increasing population density, food security, human health, illiteracy, and so forth. The 
global warming due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations in the earth’s atmosphere and the 
consequent sea level rise (SLR) are going to exacerbate the situation (Dasgupta, Huq et al. 
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2010)(Ahmed and Chowdhury 2006). Almost every sector of socio-economic life in Bangladesh is 
likely to be affected by climate change (Karim and Mimura 2008, Dasgupta, Huq et al. 2010, Khan, 
Ireson et al. 2011, Dasgupta, Huq et al. 2014) Pouliotte, et al. 2009; Rahman 2008). Over the next 25 
years, however, with the increase in the absolute size of the population, the per capita water availability 
in Bangladesh will progressively be reduced (Ahmad, et al. 2001). Under general climate variability, 
the annual per capita water availability in 2025 will become 7,670 cubic meters as against 12,162 cubic 
meters in 1991. Keeping in view the poor water availability in the dry season, the per capita available 
supply will be much less, while demand for irrigation and other purposes (i.e., industrial process water, 
domestic & municipal water supply etc.) will continue to rise (Ahmed 2006). In agricultural sector, the 
present production activities are impeded by too much water during the wet season and too little during 
the dry season.  
The social impacts, though generally not well–understood, are likely to be profound and climate 
change will affect humans through a variety of direct (changes in climate variables) and indirect 
pathways (pests and diseases; degradation of natural resources; food price and employment risks; 
displacement; conflicts, negative spirals) (Heltberg, Siegel et al. 2009). Risks and uncertainties, 
associated with the impact of climate shocks and stresses, are typically embedded in agricultural 
practices in rural areas. The agriculture sector is reportedly more vulnerable to climate variations. 
Therefore, it is important to understand climatic impacts on agroecosystems and the farmer perceptions 
of climate change and its implications. Climate change is likely to have severe impacts on the food and 
livelihood securities, human capital and wellbeing of the poor people because of their reliance on 
subsistence agriculture in rural areas of Bangladesh. On the other hand, in urban areas, informal 
settlements are mostly built illegally and without formal planning. Limited availability of water, high 
child and infant mortality rates compounded with a very high morbidity rate (malaria, tuberculosis, 
diarrhea etc) are common characteristics of such informal settlements (Dodman and Satterthwaite 
2008). Climate change also has implications for the urban poor and for rural–urban change. With 
climate change negatively affecting rural livelihoods, migration from rural to urban areas is increasingly 
likely to become the favored adaptation strategy of the mobile, rural poor. This will further exacerbate 




State Onslaught and Ethnic Faultlines 
49 
 
Governments’ Position on Rohingya Issue 
 
Bangladesh government’s position regarding the question of the Rohingyas is quite controversial in 
many terms. First flow of the Rohingyas as refugees started in 1978 following the riot in Rakhine state 
of Myanmar. However, unofficial and irregular flows from both ends have been a regular practice for 
many years. Regular flow of large Bengali population including both Hindus and Muslims who started 
to migrate and settle down in different parts of Burma began since the late nineteenth century. As part 
of the British empire, Myanmar was considered to be a place of prosperity. Almost every family in 
Chittagong used to have a connection in Burma since British Period. Such ties could be marital, social 
or business or professional. Therefore, Bengali inhabitation in Myanmar should not be a smaller one. 
It is interesting to note that the educated or semi-educated Bengali population in Myanmar is not 
suffering the controversy of identity. On the other hand, the uneducated and poor Rohingyas are victims 
of all sorts of repression. In Chittagong, Cox’s Bazaar and adjacent areas, both Rohingya men and 
women are appointed as laborers in agriculture, petty business, household works and so on. For long, 
people of Chittagong came across many communities and therefore, they are accustomed with the 
juxtaposition. At local level, Rohingyas are treated as different or ‘other’, but not as outsiders or 
unexpected. Many of these Rohingyas already had had connections in Bangladesh. They strengthened 
their ties by marriage and joining professions. 
Officially, the government of Bangladesh was not that antagonistic against the Rohingyas in the 
beginning. In fact, the refugee Rohingyas of 1978 and 1991 were treated with much empathy although 
bilateral negotiation continued. The Country office of UNHCR along with a number of refugee camps 
was established in Cox’s bazaar. The government’s attitude began to change keeping the pace with the 
change in national politics. First of all, both in 1979 and in 1991, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
(BNP) was in power. The BNP has a strong ally with the Islamist parties, especially with the anti-
liberation force Jamaat E Islami (hereafter JI), who was the part of their coalition in 1991. Many of the 
Rohingyas were used as their vote banks and political cadres. The Rohingya Muslims are the main 
arms cadres of JI which had a strong base in Cox’s Bazaar and Chittagong district. Later on, while the 
country faced series of attacks and threats from the Islamist extremist groups, many forms of Rohingya 
involvements with these connections were revealed. Remote areas of Cox’s bazaar, adjacent remote 
places of Bandarban district are found to be the dens of Islamic militants where a number of Rohingya 
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people were trained. Over the years, many Rohingyas involved in crimes, drug-dealing, smuggling and 
anti-social activities which is common among refugee population anywhere in the world. 
The pro-liberation party Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) came into power in 1996. Later they 
formed government in 2009 when they had had a land-slide victory. One of their major agenda was to 
evict militancy. The BAL always maintains a good relationship and correspondence with India which 
is their strongest base of international support. In recent years, India developed a major concern 
regarding the insurgency in ‘Seven Sisters’ of the north east. Ethnic peoples of CHT has many ethnic 
and cultural connections which poses a threat to India. A common propaganda says that these Seven 
sisters, CHT and Arakan might form a new state with the support of China as both China and India are 
trying to take control of the region. To eliminate such a possibility, the foreign minister of Bangladesh 
declared that there were no Indigenous (adivasis) in Bangladesh, and now they are constitutionally 
known as ‘Minority Ethnic groups’ (Khhudro Nri Goshthee). In this geo-political game, the Rohingyas 
are the most vulnerable community in despair. In mass media, after the attack on Buddhist Temples in 
Ramu in 2012, the anti-militancy campaign mobilized the national sentiment against Rohingyas. 
 
Locating Rohingya Refugee Camps 
 
The Rohingya camps in Bangladesh are located in Kutupalong- Balukhali expansion site, 
Hakimpara, Jamtoli, Baggohona, Chakmarkul, Unchiprang, Shamlapur under Ukhia upazila and other 
camps are located in the Leda, Alikhali, Jadimura, Nayapara under Teknaf upazila in Cox’s bazar 
district. In kutupalong area, there are 23 camps. Under the supervision of each camp, there is a camp 
in-charge committee which is managed by the Bangladesh government officials and Bangladesh army. 
Camp in-charge committee work under RRRC (Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner) and 
the members of CIC are in obligation to supervise, monitor and co-ordinate different NGOs activities 
inside the camps like what kind of works have to do. Moreover, Usually, CIC organize meetings with 
the NGOs for their activities in every week. Bangladesh Army mainly operates as a part of the CIC. 
Bangladesh Army handles the distribution of reliefs, maintenance of discipline and security of the 








Location  Female Male Total Individuals Total Families 
Camps 01 - 10 228726 210203 438929 102973 
Camps 11 - 20 143764 132878 276642 63614 
Camps 21 - 27 76046 67717 143763 32711 
Kutupalong RC* 9353 8647 18000 3548 
Nayapara RC* 14435 12487 26922 5702 
No camp** 2869 2649 5518 1299 
Total 475193 434581 909774 209847 
*Kutupalong RC includes 14,277 registered refugees (2,617 families) while Nayarapara RC 
includes 19,895 registered refugees (3,704 families) 
**This represents refugees residing outside formal camp / site boundaries 
Table – 01: Distribution of Rohingya Migrants in Bangladesh (as of March 2019). 
Source: (UNOCHA 2019) 
Map – 02: Locating Rohingya Camps in Southeast Bangladesh. 
 
The Rohingyas living in a particular block elect the Majhi5 of that block. The standard of the Majhi 
election is mainly decided on the basis of a person’s previous record, such as their educational status, 
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behavior and more priority is given if that person was a local member of the Myanmar. During the 
election, the inhabitants of the particular block get together where they give the vote to the person of 
their choice. In this case, the participators of the election need to raise their hand when the name of their 
favorite nominated candidate is called and in this way Majhi of the block gets elected. The Majhi of the 
blocks are always accountable to the head Majhis. It is the responsibility of the head Majhis to monitor 
the duties of the elected Majhis and if needed the heads will provide assistance in order to solve any 
problems and issues. These head Majhis are elected directly from the votes of the block Majhis. Priority 
on educational status and fluency in Bengali language are given preference when electing a head Majhi 
because it is the head Majhis who maintain the communication with the army, camp in charge 
committee and NGOs. 
Almost every camp has shops and markets. For instance, at the entrance of the camps, small shops 
like pharmacy, tea stalls, saloon, cloth markets etc. can be seen. Majority of the market share, 70%, are 
run by the Rohingyas and the other 30% of the market are run by the locals. Basically, the word ‘Majhi’ 
refers to ‘Boatman’. Every camp is divided into some blocks and every block has a block leader who 
is called the ‘Majhi’. Besides, the Majhis of every block is under the supervision of one head Majhi.  
They are funding in opening up the shops. These funding are mainly coming from their belongings, 
such as cash money and gold, which they managed to bring with them when fleeing from Myanmar. 
Besides, financial assistance from the relatives, who live abroad, is also contributing to these funding. 
The Rohingyas are utilizing this money in starting their businesses. Moreover, the Rohingyas are using 
the identity of the locals to issue business licenses in opening up Pharmacies inside the camp and in 
exchange the Rohingyas are paying a sum of money to those locals. In addition, according to the 
information given by a Rohingya, in order to start business and open up shops inside the camp, taking 
permission from the army is not necessary. The armies only help them to find a suitable area inside the 
camp where the shops can be built. If the shop is built on a private land, then the owner of the land has 
to be paid particular amount of money every month or if the land is a government owned land, then the 
payment should be done to the local chairman. Besides, if any NGOs want to build houses inside the 
camp, then they need to contact the ‘Majhi’ beforehand. The Majhi then employs an experienced 
person to assist the NGOs. In this case, the person who is appointed as the day laborer must pay a certain 
amount of money to the Majhi from his daily remuneration. For example, if the daily pay is 300 Tk. 
then he must pay an amount of 50 Tk. to the Majhi. Apart from that, in case of constructing roads and 
other establishments, the army usually employs workers from the Rohingyas. 
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Looming of Environmental Crisis 
 
To collect wood fuel, households traveled an average distance of 8.75 km and did this 3 days per 
week, collecting 28.65 kg per trip. During wood collection trips, households experienced a variety of 
threats. In particular, three women were attacked by elephants and 25% of women reported being 
threatened by mainly the host community. The average household consumption rate for cooking fuel 
was 4.285 kg/HH/day. For the displaced population this amounted to 54,452 tons biomass per year. 
Key findings from the fuel wood supply assessment: Observations from field plots revealed highly 
degraded forests, specifically low plant diversity and low regeneration rates, likely due to persistent 
wood fuel collection by both host and displaced communities. - Satellite imagery analysis showed that 
since 1994 wood biomass decreased by 40%. (Source IOM-FAO Assessment Study Nov,2017.) 
Map – 03: Satellite Image of the same Geographic Coordinates in different Times Showing Rapid 
Change and Destruction of Local Environment. 
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Conclusion and Ways Forward  
 
Our attitudes toward the subject of human rights law are likely to be shaped by our philosophical 
underpinnings and hence need some clarifications. Therefore, understanding the philosophic 
foundations would help us devise a translation framework that will allow us to explain human rights 
principles in the context of Bangladesh. Human rights are a set of moral principles, and include some 
recognition of the value of freedom or autonomy. However, Immanuel Kant’s compelling discussion 
on ethic underlies most of the theories of rights. Rights then flow from the autonomy of the individual, 
as a free and rational agent, in choosing his or her ends. According to Kantian thesis, a person must 
always be treated as an end, and the highest purpose of the state is to promote conditions favoring the 
free and harmonious unfolding of individuality (Shestack, 2017; Suchinmayee, 2008: 98). The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights also reflects the moral universalist influence revealed in the 
following statements: 
 “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world 
[Declaration’s opening statement].... All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
[Article 01]. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status [Article 02]” (United Nations, 




o Bangladesh needs more than careful planning, meaningful regional collaboration, and 
a need-based, forward-looking foreign diplomacy in the coming days. 
o Bangladesh needs to assess its relations with other members of SAARC countries and 
alliances. Also follow-up the repatriation pact signed with the authorities in Myanmar.  
o Myanmar has to create a decent conditions in Rakhine state for the safe and voluntary 
return or dignified return of the refugees who have fled to Bangladesh. Need to create 
diplomatic pressure on Myanmar. 
o Bangladesh needs to have medium and long-term policies to address Rohingya crisis. 
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